CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 339

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CABINET

DEFENCE AND OVERSEA POLICY COMMITTEE

CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX

OPD(67) 39th Meeting, Item 4 (FRIDAY, 8th DECEMBER 1967 at 10.30 a.m,

SOUTH AFRICA: MARITIME DEFENCE SUPPLIES

The Committee considered a memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for Defence (OPD(67) 95) on the

supply of maritime defence equipment to South Africa.

THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that a reply to an approach to us by

South Africa for the supply of maritime defence equipment valued at some £100 million had been outstanding since January 1967. In July the

South African Government had accepted that our decision would be delayed

until the end of this year but if we delayed beyond this they would assume

that our reply was negative. We faced a very difficult decision, On the

one hand failure to supply this equipment, which was irrelevant to the

maintenance and enforcement of the South African policy of apartheid, would

not merely mean the loss of these orders but would also put at risk our

trade with South Africa generally and increase the overall loss of trade

to not less than £200 million up to 1980. We should also probably lose

our naval facilities at Simonstown. The importance of the Cape route had

been clearly demonstrated following the closure this year of the Suez Canal;

even when the Canal was reopened, it would remain important. On the other

hand the political difficulties that would arise if we were to supply arms

to South Africa would be very great, not merely in Parliament and among

liberal opinion in this country but also among Commonwealth countries and in the United Nations. For many the supply of arms to South Africa was morally wrong in view of her policy of apartheid. He fully shared the general repugnance for apartheid and recognised the great political difficulties

which a decision to supply these arms to South Africa would involve.

Nevertheless he regarded the economic and strategic case for supplying the

arms as overwhelming particularly as they would not affect the ability of the

South African Government to maintain its policy of apartheid and as South

Africa would be able to obtain the equipment elsewhere if we did not supply

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